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Abstract: This paper analyses the relationship between education, meritocracy and redistribution. It first 
questions the meritocratic ideal highlighting how it relates to normative expectations that do not hold fully 
neither in their logic nor in practice. It then complements the literature on persistent inequalities by focusing 
on the opportunities for change created by current trends in the economy and in social aspirations. As the 
meritocratic argument that education is strongly linked to certain rewards in the labour market comes under 
pressure, increasing social dissatisfaction with education and skills wastage could be expected, as already 
noted in part of the political economy literature. This literature, however, has tended to conclude from such 
observations that educational expansion cannot deliver equality. The paper contributes to the debate by 
focusing on the opportunities created by current trends for the reorganization of the relationship between 
education, the economy and society. 
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Introduction  
 
 
This paper explores the effects of the relationship between the economy, educational and social mobility on 
the formation of incentives for inter-class alliances for wealth redistribution. It then looks at the dilemmas 
such relationship can produce for the prevailing moral discourse, based on meritocratic ideas, on 
redistribution. The paper questions the meritocratic ideal highlighting how it relates to expectations that do 
not hold neither in their logic nor in practice. It emphasises a crucial element of the meritocratic argument that 
is often overlooked. Meritocratic arguments hold that both IQ and effort determine levels of educational 
attainment. However, only effort is emphasised in current meritocratic debates to explain and justify 
differences in educational achievement and positions in the income distribution. Regarding practice, most 
research shows that educational attainment depends on other factors than IQ and effort exclusively and that 
the link established by the meritocratic discourse between educational attainment and occupational destination 
is at best imperfect and certainly cannot be taken for granted in the future. This raises questions as to the way 
the relationship between education, merit and labour market positions is conceived. The paper thus also 
focuses on the opportunities and constraints for change in the way this relationship is conceived that current 
trends in the economy and in social aspirations create. Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) suggest that perceptions 
of redistribution are caught between two ideologies: a strong belief in economic individualism and the ‘work 
ethic’ and the emergence of the belief on social rights and collective responsibility. I present education as a 
policy that could provide a way out of this trade-off, but on different grounds to those given by policy-makers 
and much of the academic literature.  
 
The article is a political economy study, which is mainly based on micro-economic analysis and broadly 
assumes that individuals behave rationally to achieve their goals. Yet individuals are not expected to operate 
within an institutional vacuum, and economic and political institutions play a central role in the argument. The 
paper links with studies that addresses the central question of whether and under what conditions 
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parliamentary democracy can undo the social inequalities created by capitalism. In doing so it focuses on the 
political nature of change and the interplay between ideologies and interests (cf. Polanyi 1944, Heimann 
1929). The paper is structured as follows: section two argues that support for redistribution is not only shaped 
by self-interest in the economic sense, but also by moral arguments and that education has been used 
instrumentally in preserving a moral justification for non-redistribution, through the meritocratic discourse. 
Section three examines some of the limitations of meritocratic conceptions of society. Section four outlines 
the consequences of those limitations and look at increasing income inequalities before three future scenarios 
for the relationship between education and the economy are sketched in section five. Larger consequences for 
the way in which these relate to changes in the organisation of redistribution in society are explored in section 
six. Section seven concludes.  
Moral and economic arguments: the link between education and desert 
There is a well-established moral link in welfare assistance that differentiates between those who are 
deserving and those who are not. Thus early poor laws in the 19th Century, the genesis of the Welfare State, 
often implicitly distinguished between those poor people who were seen as deserving (those not capable of 
work, such as the elderly, the sick and children) and those regarded as undeserving (those capable of work) 
(van Oorschot 2006, 2000; Katz 1989; Golding and Middleton 1982; Coughlin 1980) according to which 
different levels of protection were allocated. This view was maintained during the 20th Century and persists 
today, as reflected in public opinion surveys. The majority of the population in advanced economies support 
social rights and social equality but a large proportion also believe that some or most of the recipients of 
welfare assistance are in support for ‘dishonest reasons’ (Schiltz 1970; Kluegel and Smith 1986). Around 30% 
of the population in the USA and 60% in the Europe believe that the poor are trapped in poverty; 60% of 
Americans and 30% of European hold the opposite view: that ‘the poor are lazy’ (Alesina et al. 2001). Public 
support for social assistance to those who ‘try to improve their lot in life but still fall short’ is much higher 
than for those who do not try (Will 1993).  
 
Using the World Values Survey, Alesina and Angeletos (2005) found that countries or individuals who 
believe that wealth and success are mostly the outcome of ‘luck and connections’ rather than of hard work and 
effort tend to prefer leftist policies (see also Piketty 1996). Rutsrom and Williams (2000) also found that merit 
and entitlement arguments substantially reduce the support for egalitarianism: when participants in their 
experiments bargained over money that was earned in a preceding experimental production phase, instead of 
endowed by the researcher, they were willing to accept more unequal distributions. Procedures for obtaining 
one’s wealth are thus important. It would then seem that social justice does not require the elimination of all 
inequalities; on the contrary, it requires that the differentially deserving be differentially rewarded (Swift and 
Marshall 1997).  
 
The advent of the meritocratic discourse, prevalent in current political debates, provided a normative 
justification for desert for positions in the income distribution, through what is seen as an unproblematic link 
between education and desert. In a perfectly meritocratic society IQ and effort determine individuals’ 
achievement in school, regardless of their class of origin. The meritocratic argument went beyond normative 
concerns to praxis in the works of Bell (1972, 1973) amongst others: first it was expected that in industrial 
societies the association between individuals’ social origins and education attainment should, once level of 
ability is controlled for, decrease over time; second, the association between individual educational attainment 
and the level of employment should increase, as employers were expected to recruit exclusively on the bases 
of merit. Hence the relationship between class of origin and class of destination should diminish over time. 
Since effort is expected to play a greater part in individuals’ achievement than in previous models of society, 
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the corollary is that education can create a fair society where every individual is allocated to the place he or 
she deserves. The consequence of this is that those at the lower end of the income scale are thus deprived of a 
moral argument for redistribution (Goldthorpe 1996). If on the contrary wage inequality cannot be justified on 
efficiency nor social justice terms, then that provides grounds for income inequality to be addressed through 
redistribution. 
The shaky foundations of meritocracy 
Meritocracy has been used to establish a link between individual effort and desert, mediated through 
education. This section shows that this link is at best dubious, as academic performance does not depend only 
on effort. Educational attainment is still class biased, as is occupational destination even after controlling for 
educational attainment. Advances towards the meritocractic ideal, moreover, have not been the result of 
education alone but have depended upon the expansion in the number of highly paid jobs. The problems with 
meritocracy, from its logical formulation to its empirical testing are thus various. Most notably, authors such 
as Bell (1972, 1973) put the emphasis on the ‘effort’ part of the meritocratic equation only, forgetting the 
influence of other crucial aspects, including family background (cf. Cohen 1989). The link between class of 
origin and educational attainment has been subject to substantial sociological analysis and it is clear by now 
that educational attainment does not reflect ability alone. First, ability is not a class neutral concept (Bourdieu 
and Passeron 1977). But even if the hegemonic concept of ability is accepted, a long and established, although 
not undisputed (Jaeger 2007; Swift 2004a), strand of sociological research shows that class has a significant 
effect on educational attainment (Whelan and Layte 2002; Shavit and Muller 1998; Shavitt and Blossfeld 
1993; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), ‘presumably through a complex interplay of socio-cultural and genetic 
factors’ (Goldthorpe and Jackson 2008:99). These include the deployment of a wide range of strategies by 
middle and upper class parents, to fight for privileged positions for their children in the educational ladder 
(Lucas 2001; Ball 2003; Power et al. 2003). 
 
The social background effects observed are not only related to the marks obtained by children. There are also 
‘secondary effects’ related to educational choices following the processes described by Boudon (1974): 
parents and students from lower socio-economic backgrounds tend to overestimate the costs and 
underestimate the benefits of education and training and thus attach a low value to education. This can be 
rationally explained because they lack the social connections to transform educational qualifications into high 
occupational status. This hypothesis was tested by Jackson et al. (2007), who show that indeed secondary 
effects play against children from lower socio-economic backgrounds at the intermediate level of academic 
achievement (average marks). At this level of achievement children from low socio-economic backgrounds 
are less likely than children from high socio-economic backgrounds to continue in education. At the highest 
and lowest levels of achievement differences are much smaller. Risk aversion mechanisms accentuate these 
tendencies (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997). Thus, even when social class is substituted for human capital 
indicators aimed at capturing wider notions of ‘life chances’ as the dependent variable, social mobility rates 
continue to be low (Gershuny 2002) as educational expansion has so far disproportionately favoured the upper 
and middle class (Mare 1980). If for certain classes in society, and not others, it is the costs and risks that the 
educational investment entail that make them withdraw from education, rather than IQ and effort, the 
meritocratic discourse does not hold.  Even if these patterns were the result of a purposeful societal strategy to 
concentrate resources in its most productive individuals (under the assumption that upper and middle classes 
have a stronger than average preference for ‘hard work’ or are simply more productive) in order to then 
redistribute wealth there are other benefits to education, such as health related benefits and benefits related to 
subjective well being, which would make such a strategy morally hazardous.  
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There are some recent indications that the relationship between social class and education may have loosened 
in some countries. While some recent analyses point towards, limited, reductions in the effects of class of 
origin and educational attainment in some countries such as Britain, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, 
Poland and Sweden (Breen and Luijkx 2004; Ballarino et al. 2009) these are not sufficient to fundamentally 
alter the above assessment. Class effects remain generally strong. Moreover, even if the reduction of these 
effects were more substantial and widespread than it is, there is still the substantive issue of the link between 
educational achievement and labour market destination, which is again at best imperfect. Family background 
and social capital (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) are important for firms in their recruitment strategies, as 
companies must operate in an environment where social skills and networks play critical roles in transactions 
and exchanges. This is especially true of the most desirable positions. Top-level executives are expected to 
possess rich social capital, as they need to deal with and manage people, both within and outside the firm. 
Positions that deal with people, in new professions such as public relations, rather than machines or 
technologies also tend to be filled by occupants with better social capital (Lin 1999; Boxman et al. 1991), the 
‘netocrats’ -highly connected and highly rewarded. Hansen (2001) using data from Norway thus finds, 
consistently with this argument, that the upper classes tend to obtain the highest levels of economic reward 
even after controlling for the educational level and fields. Significantly, their advantage tends to be larger in 
‘soft’ rather than in ‘hard’ (engineering, natural sciences, agriculture transport etc, health) educational fields. 
This he argues is due to job performance being easier to measure in technical fields, such as engineering.  
 
Social inequalities in occupational destination are reinforced by individuals from working class backgrounds 
having job preferences characterised by risk aversion. Halaby (2003) finds that individuals from working class 
backgrounds prefer jobs based on pension rights and job security in contrast to entrepreneurial (high pay, high 
esteem) professions. Advantaged social origins may exhibit lower risk aversion because of the existence of a 
family financial insurance against adverse outcomes. Put differently, children from better off backgrounds can 
succeed because they can fail. The result of these dynamics is that after controlling for educational 
qualifications significant relationships between origins and destination exist (Breen 1998). Even if some 
research suggests that in some countries there was an increase in the proportion of people from all class 
origins into higher-level class occupations in the 1990s this did not reflect strong increases in social mobility 
but was rather explained by changes in the occupational structure, with the creation of more ‘room at the top’ 
(Costrell 1990; Murphy and Welch 1993; Ilg 1996; Whelan 1999; Ilg and Haugen 2000; Wright and Dwyer 
2003). In that respect, Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) conclude that under present structural conditions (e.g. 
without the creation of even greater room at the top) there can be no increased rates of upward mobility in 
advanced economies, unless the possibility of increasing downwards mobility is accepted, something that is, 
they argue, politically unlikely. Brown and Lauder (2006) and Brown and Hesketh (2004) discussions of the 
offshoring of high skilled work to low income countries by international companies suggests that the 
expansion of room at the top may be more difficult in the near future in advanced economies (cf. also Lafer 
2002). 
A closer look at income inequalities 
The above discussion has outlined two interrelated phenomena: the expansion of educational opportunities 
and likely capped upwards mobility. This section shows that, in addition to this, the differences in rewards 
between those who achieve the most desirable positions in the labour market and those who do not are 
widening. It then shows that this cannot be justified by productivity differences between workers and sectors. 
There are, therefore, two increasing arbitrary elements: first, in relation to the occupational position achieved 
in the labour market for a given level of education; second in relation to the economic rewards yielded by 
those different positions. 
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The last three decades have seen increased inter (Seshanna and Decornez 2003) and also intra-country income 
inequality (Pontusson and Rueda 2008; OECD 2008). This has occurred between and within occupations 
(Makepeace and Johnson 1997; Goos and Manning 2007). Income inequality has been defended on efficiency 
(productivity needs to be incentivised through economic rewards) and justice (it is fair for more productive 
individuals to earn more) terms, which have found a cornerstone in human capital arguments (Souto-Otero 
2007). Human capital arguments (Becker 1962; Schultz 1963) relate education to increased productivity, and 
increased productivity to higher salaries. Under the conception of human capital there is thus a perfect match 
between the rewards one reaps in the labour market, and individual productivity, provided that there are no 
distorting mechanisms such as collective wage bargaining. The affinity with the meritocratic discourse is 
clear. Following the meritocracy discourse it can also be considered fair that an individual who is productive 
obtains a better wage than another individual who is not. This, however, ignores the point that salary is only 
loosely related to productivity and that the rewards obtained in the labour market are to do with the labour 
market value of a profession rather than productivity (cf. also Hayek 1960), as research and more painfully the 
recent 2008 financial crisis has reminded us (Medoff and Abraham 1981; Toynbee and Walker 2008). 
Philippon and Reshef (2009) report that from the early 1990s until 2006 rents rather than productivity 
accounted for 30% to 50% of the wage differential between the financial sector and the rest of the private 
sector. Leslie and Oyer (2009) analyse private equity firms and Hall and Liebman (1999) chief executive 
officers’ compensations to also report strong rent effects. Hayek (1960, 1976) had already pointed to the 
incompatibility of meritocracy and a free market economy. For him, and contrary to meritocratic accounts, no 
objective definition of merit can be provided (cf. Breen and Goldthorpe 2001; Bukodi and Goldtorpe 2008). 
Market value, rather than merit, should guide economic activity. Meritocracy would require that recruitment 
be based on educational qualifications, whereas employers may well look for other traits in their employees 
(cf. Jackson 2006, 2001; Farkas 2003; Bowles and Gintins 1976). ‘Talent’ may not be rewarded in the market 
whereas opportunism may be. As Marshall et al. (1997) validly point out, social justice is not only about equal 
access to unequally rewarded positions. It also requires that unequal rewards are appropriately justified. 
Second, the individual human capital approach downplays the fact that individual productivity occurs within a 
context that enables it; individuals and firms can be more efficient in a collaborative, participatory decision-
making and wage compressed setting (Levine 1991) than in a setting where wage inequality is favoured to 
stimulate productivity (Lazear 1989). If these kinds of workplaces are not more frequent this is due to market 
imperfections, in particular poaching behaviour, rather than their lack of performance productivity (Douglas 
and Locking 2000). A similar analysis could be applied to the role of different professions within a given 
society.  
 
Rewards, it has been argued, can to an important extent be the result of an arbitrary decision based to a 
significant extent on market imperfections rather than desert. On the other hand, whilst there is some evidence 
of a rise in skill requirements in the economy (Machin 2001), this is only a partial explanation of current 
labour market trends. Rather, what can be observed is an increase in those high paid and low paid jobs that 
require non-routine tasks (that currently cannot be substituted by machines), and a decline in routine jobs, 
which fall in the middle such as clerical and skilled manual jobs (Autor et al. 2003; Gallie 1991). This takes 
out part of the middle ground where individuals with high educational levels could shelter in the past: those 
who fail to secure highly paid jobs, will fall without a parachute. The result is an increase in the qualifications 
needed even for low skills jobs as well as increasing proportions of highly skilled people taking those jobs 
(Felstead et al. 2002; Green and McIntosh 2002; Brynin 2002; Dolton and Vignoles 2000; Chevalier 2000). In 
that respect, the educational ‘human capital’ calculation more than a rational calculation becomes a gamble in 
which winners will take it all, a kind of ‘noo-kleptocracy’ (from ‘noo’ (knowledge), ‘klepto’ (thief) and kratos 
(rule), where educated and fortunate winner/rulers can make large ‘treasuries’ their own, relatively 
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independently of their productivity for society) or noo-tychocracy’ (ruling of the lucky) rather than 
meritocracy. Given the arguments presented above, the emphasis has been on the impossibility of educational 
expansion bringing about social change and on its incapacity to support both economic growth and social 
cohesion, without exploring avenues where this may be possible (cf. Jonsson and Erikson 2007). In the next 
sections I offer a more positive view, based on the possibility of coalitions amongst stakeholders with 
currently divergent interests, enabled by some of the structural economic changes reviewed, but which would 
require political articulation. Such articulation is contingent. My contention is that it will be more likely to 
occur under one set of conditions than others and I provide some preliminary views on the feasibility of these 
different possibilities.  
 
Future scenarios  
Scenario building is a technique to analyse alternative future events and their outcomes. It is particularly 
useful to challenge assumptions made about current trends. It involves constructing narrative descriptions of a 
consistent set of factors that describe plausible future options (Huss 1988; OECD 2006). These constructs can 
then be used as ‘ideal types’, as standards for comparison and to enable us to see aspects of the real world in a 
more ordered way (Weber 1947). The emphasis in this section is to explore a set of plausible options that can 
open up new debates. In this section I outline in turn three alternative scenarios, which I shall call, stretching 
the terms somehow, noocratic (from ‘noos’ intellect and ‘kratos’ rule; understood generically as rule by the 
wise, as expected by meritocratic arguments), noo-plutocratic (from ‘noos’, ‘ploutos’ wealth and ‘kratos’; rule 
by the wise and wealthy) and noo-tychocratic (from ‘noos’, ’tyche’ luck and ‘kratos’; rule by the wise and 
lucky).   
 
The noocratic panacea  
 
In the ‘noocratic’ panacea scenario the availability of educated people is all that is required to continuously 
expand the available ‘room at the top’, which is thus able to accommodate the totality of highly educated 
people. This is the ‘win-win’ scenario policy-makers in most advanced industrialised countries espouse. In 
spite of the strong rhetorical political preference for the noocratic scenario, the empirical analyses provided 
above do not suggest that a structural change to create greater room at the top can be expected in advanced 
economies, even if the unpredictability of further technological advances does not allow us to rule out this 
option in full. The plausibility of this assumption rests on the outlined human capital arguments, which 
suggest that employers continuously recognise the productive capabilities of highly educated people and 
introduce appropriate technologies to maximise their productivity potential, hence endlessly opening up more 
positions at the top. Theories of endogenous economic growth more generally argue that education can be an 
important factor in generating growth (Romer 1986, 1990; Barro 1990).  
 
Creating growth and creating unlimited high-paid occupations across the board are, however, two different 
things. Iversen and Wren (1998) convincingly argue that current service economies face a ‘trilemma’ between 
budgetary restraint, income equality and employment growth, where only two of these objectives can be 
achieved at the same time unless drastic productivity increases in the service sector, to bring its productivity 
levels more in line with those in manufacturing, are accomplished. The choice of which two of these elements 
to achieve, moreover, is in their view a political decision: each pair has different costs for society: from the 
1970s to the 1990s low earnings equality (e.g. in the UK), to spur growth in private service employment, or 
low growth in overall employment (e.g. Netherlands) have been accepted by governments that emphasised 
budgetary restraint, which precluded rapid expansion of relatively well paid public sector employment. Other 
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governments adopted strategies based on equality and high employment (e.g. Denmark), but this was at the 
expense of budgetary restraint (Iversen and Wren 1998:512). Even the most supportive and uncritical 
accounts of the increase in the need for ‘knowledge workers’ and ‘symbolic analysts’ such as those of 
Drucker (1996) and Reich (2001) acknowledge, albeit timidly, that there are limits to the proportions of 
people that can obtain these occupations. It is at best uncertain that demographic changes and the retirement 
of baby boomers will cause strong shortages in advanced industrialised countries at the high skills end, in the 
presence of an increasingly educated global workforce now also fed with masses of graduates from China, the 
former Soviet Union and India and other factors such as changes in retirement patterns (Freeman 2006; 
Brown et al. 2010).  
 
Noo-plutocracy: opting out from school 
 
If there is no increase in professional and managerial jobs commensurate with increases in educational 
achievement, to allow for upwards mobility downwards mobility should also be allowed. In the absence of 
that possibility more educated people in economically advanced countries will be underemployed. Evidence 
suggests that the underemployed would come from working and aspiring middle classes –cf. above in this 
paper. Average returns to education may still be high but they will hide strong differences and polarisation 
processes, as children from professional middle class backgrounds become the ‘winners that take it all’. This 
is the start for both the noo-plutocratic and the noo-tychocratic scenarios described in this and the following 
subsection respectively. In the noo-plutocratic scenario the aspiring working and middle classes realising the 
existing but limited opportunities to achieve top positions in the labour market even after higher schooling 
‘opt out’ of education because of the costs and uncertainties involved it. In the words of Brown and Lauder 
(2006) ‘within the foreseeable future the children from middle-class backgrounds that fail to gain access to 
these [elite] universities will be left to fight over the scraps’ in the labour market. The frustration generated by 
this would naturally be compounded by the current trend in the conceptualisation of education as a 
commodity. Students increasingly enter education, in particular higher education, with high labour market 
aspirations accentuated by government messages over the economic value of schooling (Souto-Otero and 
Whitworth 2006).  
 
Educational expansion would have initially occurred under this scenario but restricted labour market 
opportunities would have created, at a saturation point, a ‘dissatisfied lumpenintelligentsia’. This dissatisfied 
lumpenintelligentsia would thus comprise a mass of people from working and aspiring middle classes who 
have gone into higher education largely based on expected high labour market returns (Bloom 2007; Knight et 
al. 2003; Tierney 2002), that they never reaped. Whereas high aspirations are necessary to succeed in 
education (Morgan 2005), when these are not fulfilled psychological downwards adjustment to conform to 
more informed and realistic expectations are lengthy and hence (because individuals compare outcomes with 
their initial aspirations for a long time) ‘utility’ or ‘well-being’ costly (Mattey and Dwenger 2007; Nauta et al. 
1998; Stutzer 2004; Bandura 2001). The lumpenintelligentsia will increasingly perceive the education system 
as a reproductive organ of society, rather than a vending machine of opportunity tickets in the form of 
qualifications. Under this scenario, then, realising the increasing costs and increasingly uncertain returns from 
schooling withdrawal (or ‘de-schooling’, albeit understood in a different way to Illich 1971) is the preferred 
strategy in future generations. Children from lower socio-economic backgrounds (working class and non 
professional middle classes) decide not to go on to achieve higher education credentials.  
 
What would be the likely social consequences under the de-schooling scenario? Since withdrawal would 
come from children from lower socio-economic backgrounds, little social change would occur. Yet, as the 
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limits of the meritocratic discourse become more and more apparent through time, the legitimacy of the 
system would become under increasing pressure, which might eventually lead to system changes. 
Developments in the fall of communism resonate with such a reaction. Marshall et al. (1997) describe an 
intense gap between propaganda on meritocracy and reality in the former Eastern European communist 
societies. As the propaganda promises were not delivered, they exacerbated the already considerable problems 
of regime legitimization, which is likely to have had an important role in contributing to effect social change 
(Marshall et al. 1999; see also Wesolowski and Mach 1986). Alternatively, a social devaluation of degrees so 
that lower expectations are attached to them (Heath et al. 2008) and an accentuation of the stratification of 
educational institutions could occur, to justify the status quo –trends that can also occur under the noo-
tychocratic scenario outlined below. Under these conditions the upper classes and professional middle classes, 
who will continue to send their offspring to the best universities and to select more ‘profitable’ subjects 
(Ayalon and Yogev 2005; Walker and Zhu 2002) through the social reproduction mechanisms described 
above in this paper, would continue to assert the moral meritocratic argument against redistribution and would 
reap the economic rewards of schooling. The devaluation of degrees could also act as a ‘buffer’ for 
governments to escape from the political fallout that would occur under de-schooling, in particular in the 
context of the discourse on the knowledge economy. We observe today, indeed, a certain movement towards 
these trends with high variability in the skills of graduates (Chevalier 2000), narrow vocational trends and the 
importance of international rankings of educational institutions (Wolf 2002; Lucas 2001). Moreover, 
economic analysis shows that the return to the quality of the higher education institution attended is large and 
higher for younger cohorts (Chevalier and Colon 2003), which is consistent with an increased stratification 
accompanying higher education expansion. 
 
Noo-tychocracy: gambling for social mobility 
 
The difference between scenarios two and three relates to the existence of a saturation point or a turning point 
for educational expansion. Unlike in the previous scenario, in the noo-tychocratic scenario, people from 
working and aspiring middle classes do not withdraw from education at a saturation point. Instead they 
continue to undergo long periods of schooling in the prospect of the uncertain rewards that education could 
still offer to them in the labour market. They would thus enter a ‘lottery’, or rather ‘poker game’ situation, 
where both skill and luck are necessary. In the noo-tychocratic scenario, thus, the system continues expanding 
and students from lower socio-economic backgrounds are ready to take an educational gamble instead of 
withdrawing from education. Processes of labour market polarisation, we have already observed, have been 
reducing the availability of intermediate jobs such as those in skilled trades, reducing the opportunities outside 
college education but provide attractive benefits for those who achieve top occupations.  
 
How could this work, if social mobility is low, to avoid de-schooling? This scenario would require, besides 
some willingness to gamble, that at least a certain degree of upwards and downwards mobility is possible. 
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) show how premium mechanisms are used by gangs to attract new recruits into 
the most dangerous endeavours –certainly more than enrolling into a higher education course- such as drug 
selling, even though the average salary for a member of a drug selling gang is relatively low compared to the 
legitimate labour market alternative, once risk is accounted for. Compensation in gangs is highly skewed and 
the prospect of future riches only available to a few, but this is the primary economic motivation for entrance 
in their game. The degree of social mobility under this scenario however would most likely be limited and fall 
short from the meritocratic principle, given existing economic and social structures.  
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The last three sections have problematised the relationship between merit, class, labour market uncertainty 
and income distribution. Whilst today’s societies may be more meritocractic in relation to access to education 
than in the past, employment is a more difficult matter, as it has been argued above. In the next section I argue 
that in spite of current concerns with increasing the links between education, employability and upwards 
mobility, opportunities lie in a looser link between education and employability. This could create the 
conditions to move towards a new framework for the organisation of the relationship between education and 
production, consumption and redistribution processes, provided that the importance of positional goods is 
greater than a basic standard of welfare (see also Layard 2005; Swift 2004b) and other conditions, such as low 
levels of stratification of the education system, are met. Indeed, social fluidity as measured by sociologists 
may be low and yet people from the working classes may have greater possibilities for consumption now than 
in 1900s (Swift 2004a). This may, in fact, help to explain to a large extent the survival of the capitalist mode 
of production: moderated by expenses on State legitimation activities capitalism has afforded in the last two 
hundred years a better standard of living for increasing proportions of the population, at least in advanced 
industrialised societies. To the extent that this is more important than the existence of unjustified inequalities 
(between classes, between generations within a family or even between world regions), movement for change 
can be slow or not occur. 
A new relationship between education and inequality: further scenario specifications and associated 
moral, economic and political arguments 
This section outlines how increasing levels of education could result, under certain conditions, in a more equal 
society as a product of moral pressures and could also be seen as a good social investment. As income 
inequalities grow, if social mobility remains limited regardless of academic merit and the relationship between 
education and its expected returns becomes looser, educational expansion could recede, as in the noo-
plutocratic scenario. If there are signs of this happening, this situation would create a crisis of legitimacy as 
well as detrimental social and economic consequences associated with the reduction of education levels. This 
could lead to pressures towards the provision of greater ‘real labour market mobility’ or, alternatively, an 
‘insurance’ from society towards the increasingly uncertain labour market returns of education, in the form of 
greater economic redistribution. Such insurance would be required for people to take-up education. Under 
these conditions social policy would become both emancipatory and a precondition for economic efficiency. 
These pressures, however, would be mediated in different ways at the national level by complex national 
institutional settings including electoral, class coalitional, economic and social factors. 
 
Brown and Lauder (2006) argue that there is an increasing likelihood of something similar to what I have 
described as the noo-tychocratic scenario and warn in relation to this development. I argue that such a 
development may also hide new opportunities. I focus on a scenario of educational expansion in a relatively 
lowly stratified higher education system where people from lower socio-economic backgrounds gamble by 
embarking on high educational investments to achieve relatively fixed numbers of rewarding positions in the 
labour market. If only low levels of mobility are allowed under that situation there would be a return to the 
noo-plutocratic scenario with a trend towards de-schooling as working classes and people from lower middle 
classes grow increasingly frustrated with the ‘opportunity trap’ (Brown 2006) in which they are absorbed. 
Alternatively, the noo-plutocracy may be accepted but de-schooling not occur; the upper classes would then 
become dispossessed from their moral argument for inequality based on the workings of a meritocratic 
society. If, on the contrary, a significant degree of upwards mobility is allowed to avoid opting out of 
education and to moderate pressures from the working classes, downwards mobility would also need to 
increase. I argue that there is potential for the outcome of both options to produce a more redistributive 
society, in the first case as already said driven mainly by demands from the working classes, as the moral 
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argument for inequality is increasingly questioned, and in the second case by the demand of the middle 
classes. This second option deserves greater explanation. Currently, individuals in the working classes are 
those with a greater economic interest in redistribution as they are its main beneficiaries. Yet, the prospects of 
future positions in the income ladder affect individuals’ current preferences for redistributive policies (Alesina 
and la Ferrara 2005). The developments outlined in the above options could as such transform the political 
landscape and the incentives of different stakeholders regarding redistribution and thereby the possibilities for 
cross-class alliances in particular if, as argued in the previous section, comparative standards of living are 
prevalent in class calculations. As Cusak et al. (2006) report, preferences on redistribution vary according to 
the degree of risk in the labour market, particularly the risk of unemployment. A situation with greater 
downwards mobility will leave the offspring of the non professional middle classes in a vulnerable position. 
Under these conditions part of the middle classes will be more willing to ally with working classes to adopt 
generous and universal (instead of targeted, which, albeit cheaper, would only benefit those worse off –Korpi 
and Palme 1998; see also van Oorschot 2000) redistributive strategies in an attempt to insure their offspring 
against downwards income mobility. The increasing randomness of rewards by profession and within 
professions already described in this paper  as well as in the chances of entering a given profession would 
transform the landscape closer to a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Vickrey 1945; Rawls 1971) about the future, although, 
and as in any real world situations (Heckman 2001), from a certain distance. This could transform existing 
redistributive preferences. Carlsson et al. (2003) reported using economic experiments that Indian students are 
strongly inequality averse when choosing from behind a veil of ignorance, with around one fifth choosing 
income distributions closest to Rawlsian notion of equality, which is in line with previous results from 
Sweden by Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) (cf. also Becker and Miller 2009). Although there is much 
discussion on the external validity of economic experiments like these (List and Shogren 2006), in particular 
those that deal with moral and public issues, their shortcomings seem to be more related to magnitudes (size 
of the effects detected) than qualitative insights  (nature of the relationships observed) (Levitt and List 2007), 
and their results, on the whole present reasonably solid degree of validity (Chang et al. 2009). Public opinion 
surveys, moreover, provide consistent results to those from experiments in relation to the effects of 
uncertainty: Van Oorschot (2000) thus reports that young people are in greater favour of social assistance, 
which can be justified as they are less certain about their future place in the distribution of income than adults. 
Working classes could thus capitalise on the increasing insecurity and uncertainty of the middle classes to 
progress their demands for greater wealth redistribution, through changes in taxation rules. 
Conclusions 
I have argued that the available evidence suggests that the moral arguments about desert derived from the 
meritocratic discourse are logically and empirically flawed, and I have outlined three possible scenarios - 
admittedly in a tentative way, in an area that will require additional research.  In the first scenario there is a 
movement towards a better match between educational achievement and occupational destination (the 
‘panacea’ noocratic scenario) whereas in the second and third scenarios there is not. In the second scenario 
(noo-plutocratic), if there is no increase in the matching between educational achievement and occupation, 
and no increase in the ‘room at the top’ in the labour market either, some abandonment of the schooled 
society due to an increasing dissatisfaction with the mismatch between the meritocratic rhetoric and reality 
would occur. Alternatively, in the third scenario (noo-tychocratic) working and middle classes would be 
willing to take an educational gamble in the pursuit of potentially high but with increasingly uncertain labour 
market returns. Two main implications are of note. First, and against much of the literature that has 
emphasised sustained trends in educational and labour market inequality, mass education can still deliver, I 
argued, a more egalitarian society under certain conditions. This would require a further opening up of 
education systems to increasing proportions of the population as well as, in particular under the noo-
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tychocratic scenario, investment in quality education across the board to fight against the stratification of the 
educational system. Second, a re-conceptualisation of education towards citizenship values and away from 
exclusive concerns with employability would also be an important element for the changes required for 
greater levels of redistribution  to materialise.  
 
These are challenging requirements in contemporary industrialised societies. These changes within the 
education system, moreover, will not be sufficient to arrive at a more equal society. Under all of these 
scenarios political mobilisation would be required to that end. The outlined changes would not generate more 
equality per se, but would rather be a condition to cement political mobilisation that may enable further 
redistribution. The working and in some scenarios the middle classes, in the end, would need to be mobilised 
electorally for greater equality. A good part of the importance of education in this context lies in its capacity 
to generate a justification and incentives for interclass alliances, in particular between working and middle 
classes This, as it has been argued, will require commitment towards high educational achievement from all 
social groups, to ‘force’ greater labour market uncertainty for the middle classes through increasing 
competition for jobs, so that negative views of the desert of redistributive allocations to the worse off are 
avoided. If such commitment does not materialise, the moral justification for inequality will continue to be 
present. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Hugh Lauder and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on earlier versions 
of this paper. All remaining errors are mine. 
 
Authors’ Biographies 
 
 
 
References 
 
 
Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G. M. (2005) ‘Fairness and redistribution: US vs. Europe’ American Economic 
Review, Vol. 95, pp. 913-935. 
 
Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005) ‘Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities’ Journal of 
Public Economics, vol. 89, pp. 897-931.  
 
Alesina, A., Glaese, E. and Sacerdote, B. (2001) ‘Why doesn’t the United States have a European-style 
Welfare State?’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp.187-277. 
 
Autor, D. H., Levy, F. and Murnane, R. J. (2003) “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An 
Empirical Exploration,” Quarterly Journal of Economics CXVIII, pp. 1279–1333. 
 
Ayalon, H. and Yogev, A. (2005) ‘Field of Study and Students' Stratification in an Expanded System of 
Higher Education: The Case of Israel’ European Sociological Review Vol. 21(3):  
pp. 227-241. 
 
! "$!
Ball, S. (2003) Class strategies and the education market: the middle class and social advantage. London, 
Routledge Falmer. 
 
Ballarino, G., Bernardi, F., Requena, M. and Schadee, H. (2009) ‘Persistent inequalities? Expansion of 
education and class inequality in Italy and Spain’ European Sociological Review, vol. 25(1), pp. 123-
138. 
 
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G.V. and Pastorelli, C., (2001) ‘Self-Efficacy Beliefs as Shapers of 
Children’s Aspirations and Career Trajectories’ Child  
Development, Vol. 72(1), pp. 187-206.  
 
Barro, R. J. (1990) ‘Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth’ Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 89(5), pp. 103-125. 
 
Becker, A. and Miller, L. M. (2009) ‘Promoting justice by treating people unequally: An experimental study’ 
JENA Economic Research Papers, 2009-008. 
 
Becker, G. (1962) ‘Investment in human capital: a theoretical perspective’ The Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 70(5), pp. 9-42. 
 
Bell, D. (1972) ‘On meritocracy and equality’ The Public Interest, vol.29, pp. 29-68. 
 -(1973) The coming of post-industrial society. Basic Books, New York. 
 
Bloom, J. L. (2007) ‘(Mis)reading social class I the journey towards college: Youth development in urban 
America’, Teachers College Record, vol.109(2), pp.343-368. 
 
Boudon, R. (1974) Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality. John Wiley, New York. 
 
Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J.C. (1977) Reproduction: in Education, Society and Culture. Sage, London. 
 
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1976) Schooling in Capitalist America. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Boxman E.A.W., De Graaf P.M., Flap H.D. (1991) ‘The impact of social and human capital on the income 
attainment of Dutch managers’ Social Networks, Vol. 13, pp. 51–73  
 
Breen, R. (1998) ‘The persistence of class origins inequalities amongst school leavers in the Republic of 
Ireland 1984-1993’ British Journal of Sociology, vol.49(2), pp. 275-298. 
 
Breen, R. and Goldthorpe, J.H. (1997) 'Explaining educational differentials: towards a formal rational action 
theory' Rationality and Society, Vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 275-305. 
 -(2001) ‘Class, mobility and merit: the experience of two British cohorts’ European Sociological 
Review, Vol.17(2), pp. 81-101. 
 
Breen, R. and Luijkx, (2004) ‘Conclusions’ in Breen, R. (ed.) Social Mobility in Europe. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
! "%!
Brown, P. (2006) ‘The opportunity trap’ in Lauder, H., Brown, Dillabough, J. A. and Halsey (eds.) Education, 
globalization and social change. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Brown, P. and. Hesketh, A. (2004) Employability and jobs in the knowledge economy. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Brown, P. and Lauder, H. (2006) ‘Globalisation, knowledge and the myth of the magnet economy’ 
Globalisation, Societies and Education, Vol. 4(1), pp. 25-57. 
 
Brown, P., Lauder, H. and Ashton, D. (2010) The global auction, New York, Oxford University Press. 
 
Brynin, M. (2002) ‘Overqualification in employment’ Work, Employment and Society Vo..16(4), pp. 637-654. 
 
Bukodi, E. and Goldthorpe, J. H. (2008) Market versus meritocracy: Hungary as a critical case. Un published 
manuscript. 
 
Carlsson, F., Guptaz, G. and Johanssion-Stenman (2003) ‘Choosing from behind a veil of ignorance in India’ 
Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 10, pp. 825-827. 
 
Chang, J. B., Lusk, J. L. and Norwood, F. B. (2009) ‘How closely do hypothetical surveys and laboratory 
experiments predict field behavior?’ American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol.91(2), pp. 518-
534. 
 
Chevalier, A. (2000) “Graduate Over-education in the UK,” LSE, Centre Economics of Education discussion 
paper no. 7. 
 
Chevalier, A. and Conlon, G. (2003) ‘Does it pay to attend a prestigious university?’ IZA DP 848, Bonn, 
Germany. 
 
Cohen, G. A. (1989) ‘On the currency of egalitarian justice’ Ethics, Vol.99, pp. 906-944. 
 
Costrell, R. M. (1990) “Methodology in the ‘Job Quality’ Debate,” Industrial Relations XXIX (1990), 94–
110. 
 
Coughlin, R. (1980) Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy: Attitudes towards Taxes and Spending in 
Industrial Societies. Berkely: Institute of International Studies, University of California. 
 
Cusak, T., Iversen, T. and Rehm, P. (2006) ‘Risk at work: The demand and supply sides of government 
redistribution’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol.22(3), pp. 365-389. 
 
Dolton P. and Vignoles, A. (2000) ‘The incidence and effects of overeducation in the UK graduate labour 
market’ Economics of Education Review, Vol. 19(2), pp. 179-198. 
 
Douglas A. Hibbs Jr., D. A. and Locking, H. (2000) ‘Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: Evidence 
for Sweden’ Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 18(4), pp. 755-782. 
 
! "&!
Drucker, P. (1996) Landmarks of tomorrow: A report on the New “Post-Modern” World. New Jersey, 
Transaction Publishers. 
 
Erikson, R. and Goldthorpe, J. H. (1992) The constant flux: a study of class mobility in industrial societies. 
Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
 
Farkas, (2003) ‘Cognitive Skills and Noncognitive Traits and Behaviors in Stratification Processes’ Annual 
Review of Sociology, Vol. 29, pp. 541–562. 
 
Felstead, A., Gallie, D. and Green, F. (2002) “Work Skills in Britain, 1986–2001,” Department for Education 
and Skills, Sheffield. 
 
Freeman, R. (2006) ‘Is a great labor shortage coming? Replacement demand in the global economy’ NBER 
Working Paper Series, number 12541. 
 
Johansson-Stenman, O., Carlsson, F. and Daruvala, D. (2002) ‘Measuring future grandparents’ preferences for 
equality and relative standing’ Economic Journal, Vol. 112, pp. 362–83. 
 
Gallie, D. (1991) ‘Patterns of skills change: Upskilling, deskilling or polarization of skills?’  Work, 
Employment and Society, Vol. 5(3), pp. 319-351. 
 
Gershuny, J. (2002) Beating the Odds (1): Intergenerational social mobility from a human capital 
perspective, Working Paper 2002-17, Institute for Social and Economic Research/ University of Essex. 
 
Golding, P. and Middleton, S. (1982) Images of Welfare: Press and Public Attitudes to Poverty. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Goldthorpe, J. H. and Jackson, M. (2008) ‘Education-based meritocracy: The barriers to its realization’ in 
Lareau, A. and Conley, D. (eds.) Social Class: How does it work? New York, Russel Sage Foundation. 
 -(2007) ‘Intergenerational class mobility in contemporary Britain: political concerns and empirical 
findings’ British Journal of Sociology, Vol.58(4), pp. 525-546. 
 
Goos, M. and Manning, A. (2007) ‘Lousy and lovely jobs: the rising polarization of work in Britain’ The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol.89(1), pp. 118-133. 
 
Green, Francis, and Steven McIntosh (2002) “Is there a Genuine Underutilisation of Skills Amongst the Over-
Qualified,” LSE CEP working paper.  
 
Halaby, C.H. (2003) ‘Where Job Values Come From: Family and Schooling Background, Cognitive Ability 
and Gender’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 68(2); pp. 251-278.   
 
Hall, B.J. and Liebman, J. B. (1998) ‘Are CEOs Really Paid Like Beaurocrats?’ Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 113(3), pp. 653–91. 
 
Hansen, M. N. (2001) ‘Education and economic rewards: variations by social-class origin and income 
measures’ European Sociological Review, Vol.17(3), pp. 209-231. 
! "'!
 
Hasenfeld Y. and Rafferty J. A. (1989) “The determinants of public attitudes towards the welfare state” Social 
Forces, vol.67(4). 
 
Hayek, F. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. Routledge, London. 
 -(1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty. Routledge, London. 
 
Heath, S., Fuller, A. and Paton, K. (2008) ‘Network-based ambivalence and educational decision-making: a 
case study of non-participation in higher education’ Research Papers in Education, vol.23(2), pp. 219-
229. 
 
Heckman, J.J. (2001) ‘Accounting for heterogeneity, diversity and general equilibrium in evaluating social 
programs’ Economic Journal, Vol. VIII, pp. 654-699.   
 
Heimann, E. (1929) Sociale Theorie der Kapitalismus. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, rpt 1980. 
 
Huss, W. R. (1988) ‘A move toward scenario analysis’ International Journal of Forecasting, vol.4(3), pp. 
377-388. 
 
Ilg, R. E. (1996) “The Nature of Employment Growth, 1989–1995,” Monthly Labor Review CXIX, pp. 29–36.  
 
Ilg, R. E., and Haugen, S. E. (2000) “Earnings and Employment Trends in the 1990s,” Monthly Labor Review, 
pp. 21–33.  
 
Illich, I. (1971) Deschooling society. London and New York, Marion Boyars. 
 
Iversen, T. and Wren, A. (1998)  ‘Equality, employment and budgetary restraint: the trilemma of the service 
economy’ World Politics, Vol. 50(4), pp. 507-546. 
 
Jackson, M. (2006) ‘Personality traits and occupational attainment’ European Sociological Review, vol.22(2), 
pp.187-199. 
 -(2001) ‘Non-meritocratic job requirements and the reproduction of class. An investigation’ Work, 
Employment and Society, vol.15(3), pp. 619-630. 
 
Jackson, M., Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J.H. and Yaish, M. (2007) ‘Primary and secondary effects in class 
differentials in educational attainment’ Acta Sociologica, Vol.50(3), pp. 211-229. 
 
Jæger, M. M. (2007)'Educational mobility across three generations: the changing impact of parental social 
class, economic, cultural and social capita’ European Societies, Vol. 9(4), pp. 527-550.  
 
Jonsson, J. O. and Erikson, R. (2007) ‘Why educational expansion is not such a great strategy for equality: 
theory and evidence’ in Shavit, Y., Arum, R. and Gamoran, A. (eds.) Stratification in Higher 
Education: A comparative study. Stanford University Press. 
 
Katz, M. (1989) The Undeserving Poor: from the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
! "(!
 
Kluegel J. R. and Smith E. R. (1986) Beliefs about inequality: American’s views of what ought to be. New 
York, DeGruyter. 
Knight, M., Norton, N., Bentley, C., and Dixon, I. (2003) ‘The power of black and Latina/o counterstories: 
Urban families and college-going processes’ Anthropology and Education Quarterly, vol.  35 (1), pp. 
99–120. 
 
Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (1998) ‘The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality: Welfare State 
institutions, inequality and poverty in the Western Countries’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 63, 
pp. 661-687. 
 
Lafer, G. (2002) The job training charade. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
 
Lazear, E. (1989) ‘Pay equality and industrial politics’ Journal of Political Economy Vol. 97(3), pp., 561-580.  
 
Layard, R. (2005) Happiness. London, Penguin Press. 
 
Leslie, P. and Oyer, P. (2009) ‘Managerial incentives and value creation: evidence from private equity’ NBER 
Working Papers, number 14331. 
 
Levine, D. (1991) ‘Cohesiveness, Productivity, and Wage Dispersion’ Institute for Research on Labor and 
Employment. Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper Series. Paper iirwps-
014-89. 
 
Levitt, S. D. and Venkatesh, S. A. (2000) ‘An economic analysis of drug selling gang’s finances’ The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 755-789.   
 
Levitt, S. D. and List, J. A. (2007) ‘What do laboratory experiments tell us about the real world?’ Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol.71, pp 153-174. 
 
Lin, N. (1999) ‘Social networks and status attainment’ Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 25, pp. 467-487. 
 
List, J. A. and Shogren, J.F. (1998) ‘Calibration of the difference between actual and hypothetical valuations 
in a field experiment’ Journal of Economic Behavior and Evaluation, vol.38, pp. 193-205. 
 
Lucas, S. R. (2001). ‘Effectively maintained inequality: education transitions, track mobility, and social 
background effects’ American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 106, pp. 1642–1690. 
 
Machin, S. (2001) ‘The changing nature of labour demand in the new economy and skill-biased technology 
change’ Oxford Bulleting of Economics and Statistics, vol.63, pp.753-776. 
 
Makepeace, G. and Johnson, D. (1997) ‘Occupational advantage in the 80s: An analysis of lifetime earning’ 
Work, Employment and Society, Vol. 11(3), pp. 401-411. 
 
Mare, R. D. (1980) ‘Social Background and School Continuation Decisions’ Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 75, pp. 15-32. 
! ")!
 
Marshall, G., Swift, A. and Roberts, S. (1997) Against the odds? Social class and social justice in industrial 
societies. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
 
Marshall, G., Swift, A., Routh, D. and Burgoyne, C. (1999) ‘What is and what ought to be? Popular beliefs 
about distributive justice in thirteen countries’ European Sociological Review, Vol.15(4), pp. 349-367. 
 
Matthey, A. and Dwenger, N. (2007) ‘Don’t aim too high: the potential costs of high aspirations’ Jena 
Economic Research Papers 2007-097. 
 
Medoff, J. L. and Abraham, K. G. (1981) ‘Are those paid more really more productive? The case of 
experience’ Journal of Human Resources, vol. 16(2), pp. 186-216. 
 
Morgan, S. L. (2005) On the edge of commitment: Educational attainment and race in the United States. 
Stanford, Stanford University Press.  
 
Murphy, K. M., and Welch, F. (1993) “Occupational Change and the Demand for Skill, 1940–1990,” 
American Economic Review LXXXIII (1993), 122–136. 
 
Nauta, M., Epperson, D.L. and Kahn, J., (1998) ‘A Multiple-Groups Analysis of Predictors of Higher Level 
Career Aspirations Among Women in Mathematics, Science, and Engineering Majors’ Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, Vol. 45(4), pp. 483-496. 
 
OECD (2008) Growing unequal? Income distribution and poverty in OECD countries OECD, Paris. 
 -(2006) Think scenarios, rethink education. OECD, Paris. 
 
Oorschot, W. (2000) ‘Who should get what and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of 
solitarity among the public’ Policy and Politics, vol. 28(1), pp. 33-48. 
 -(2006) ‘Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of 
European welfare states’ Journal of European Social Policy, Vol 16(1): pp. 23–42. 
 
Philippon, T. and Reshef, A. (2009) ‘Wages and human capital in the US financial industry: 1909-2006’ 
NBER Working Paper, Number 14644. 
 
Piketty, T. (1996) Mobilite Economique et Attitudes Politiques face a` la Redistribution, CEPREMAP 
Working Paper n. 9603. 
 
Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation. New York, Rinehart. 
 
Pontusson, J. and Rueda, D. (2008) ‘Inequality as a source of political polarization: A comparative analysis of 
twelve OECD countries’ in C. Anderson and P. Beramendi (eds.) Democracy, Inequality, and 
Representation: A Comparative Perspective. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; pp. 312-353. 
 
Power, S., Edwards, T., Whitty, G. and Wigfall, V. (2003) Education and the middle class. Buckingham, 
Open University Press. 
 
! "*!
Rawls, J. (1971) A theory of justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
 
Reich, R. B. (1991) The work of nations: preparing ourselves for 21
st
 Century Capitalism. New York, Vintage 
Books. 
 
Romer, P. (1986) ‘Increasing Returns and Long-Rung Growth’ Journal of Political Economy, 94 (5), 1002-
10037.  
  
Romer, P. (1990) ‘Endogenous Technological Change’ Journal of Political Economy 98, (5), part 2, S71-102. 
 
Rutström, E. E. and Williams, M. B. (2000) “Entitlements and fairness: an experimental study of distributive 
preferences.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 43 (1): pp. 75-89. 
 
Seshanna, S. and Decornez, S. (2003) ‘Income polarization and inequality across countries: an empirical 
study’ Journal of Policy Modeling, Vol. 25, pp. 335–358  
 
Shavit, Y. and Blossfeld, H. P. (eds.) (1993) Persistent Inequality: Changing Educational Attainment in 
Thirteen Countries. Boulder (Colorado): Westview Press. 
 
Shavit, Y., and Müller, W., (Eds.) (1998), From School to Work: A Comparative Study of Educational 
Qualifications and Occupational Destinations, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Schiltz, M. E. (1970) Public attitudes towards social security 1935-1965. Washington D.C., Government 
Printing Office. 
 
Schultz, T. H. (1963) The economic value of education. New York, Columbia University Press. 
 
Souto-Otero, M. (2007) ‘Access to post-compulsory education and training: economic, sociological and 
political determinants and remaining research gaps’ Comparative Education, vol.43(4), pp. 571-586. 
 
Souto-Otero, M. and Whitworth, A. (2006) ‘Equality in higher education in Spain and the UK: Mismatch 
between rhetoric and policy?’ Higher Education Quarterly, vol.60(2), pp. 167-186. 
 
Stutzer, A., (2004) ‘The role of income aspirations in individual happiness’ Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, Vol. 54(1), pp. 89-109.  
 
Sutter, M. and Weck-Hannemann (2003) ‘Taxation and the veil of ignorance –A real effort experiment on the 
Laffer curve’ Public Choice, Vol. 15, pp. 217-240. 
 
Swift, A. (2004a) ‘Would perfect mobility be perfect?’ European Sociological Review, Vol. 20(1), pp. 1—11. 
 -(2004b) ‘The morality of school choice’ Theory and research in education, Vol.2(1), pp. 7-21. 
 
Swift, A. and Marshall, G. (1997) 'Meritocratic equality of opportunity: Economic efficiency, social justice, or 
both?' Policy Studies, Vol. 18(1), pp. 35-48. 
 
! #+!
Tierney, W. (2002) ‘Parents and families in precollege preparation: The lack of connection between research 
and practice’ Educational Policy, vol. 16(4), pp. 588–606. 
 
Toynbee, P. and Walker, D. (2008) Unjust rewards: Exposing greed and inequality in Britain today. Granta 
Books. 
 
Vickrey, W. (1945) ‘Measuring marginal utility by reactions to risk’ Econometrica, Vol. 13, pp. 215–36.  
 
Walker I. and Y. Zhu (2001) The returns to education: Evidence from the Labour Force Surveys, University of 
Warwick, mimeo. 
 
Weber, M. (1947) Theory of social and economic organization. New York, Free Press. 
 
Wesolowski, W. and Mach, B. (1986) ‘’Unfulfilled systemic functions of social mobility’ International 
Sociology, Vol. 1, Parts I and III pp. 19-35; pp. 173-187. 
 
Whelan, C. T. (1999) ‘Social mobility in Ireland in the 1990s: Evidence from the 1994 Living in Ireland 
survey’ The Economic and Social Review, Vol.30(2), pp. 133-158 
 
Whelan, C. T. and Layte, R. (2002) ‘Late Industrialization and the Increased Merit Selection Hypothesis’, 
European Sociological Review, Vol.18. 35-50. 
 
Will J. A. (1993) “The dimensions of poverty: public perceptions of the deserving poor” Social Science 
Research, Vol.22, pp. 312-332. 
 
Wolf, A. (2002) Does education matter?: myths about education and economic growth. London, Penguin 
Books. 
 
Wright, E. O., and Dwyer, R. (2003)“The Patterns of Job Expansions in the United States: A Comparison of 
the 1960s and 1990s,” Socio- Economic Review 1, pp. 289–325 
